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Abstract: Some students who would benet from college may choose not to attend if
they are unaware of all costs and benets involved. In this case, publically provided infor-
mation may induce personally optimal attendance decisions, and if such information is cheap
enough to provide then government intervention may also be socially optimal. Evidence from
the Texas GO Centerproject suggests that this may indeed be the case. GO Centers are
novel high-school information and awareness centers, usually a dedicated classroom, that pro-
vide many traditional guidance counseling services with the exception that they are run by
student peers. They target academically prepared students who might not otherwise choose
to attend college, providing motivation and information on all aspects of the college-going
process. We use the roll-out of the program to identify its impact, along with detailed panel
data on the universe of Texas public school students. The program signicantly increased
college applications which led to increased enrollment rates, especially amongst Hispanic and
low-income students. One-year college persistence rates also increased signicantly. These
results have important policy implications, suggesting that a relatively cheap intervention
can induce meaningful increases in human capital by reducing informational asymmetries.
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Leaders from the state of Texas believe that higher education enrollment rates are too low,
and that two key factors inhibit otherwise academically prepared students from enrolling in
college (Closing the Gaps 2000). First, state leaders are concerned that there is a culture
of aversion towards academic success that is particularly pervasive amongst low-income and
minority students attending low-performing high schools. Second, state leaders are concerned
about informational asymmetries in the market for higher education. Specically, there is
concern that students attending low-performing schools lack easily accessible information
about the college going process information on college choice, applications, nancial aid,
SAT taking, and the actual experience of attending college. To address these concerns,
in the fall of 2003 the state founded 41 high school based GO Centerswhose goal is to
provide information on college choice, the application process, nancial aid, and SAT-taking
to current high school students, as well as to convince students of the value of a college
education by creating a college-going cultureamongst students. The key question that we
address in this paper is whether providing such information and assistance increases college
outcomes for the targeted populations.
From an economic point of view, the GO Center program attacks the problem of low
college enrollment rates on two fronts. First, the program uses an extensive marketing cam-
paign relying heavily on the power of peer-to-peer persuasion to alter studentsunderlying
preferences for college. The emphasis here is on creating a college-going cultureto replace
the perceived culture of apathy in low-performing schools. Second, the program uses on-
campus computing resources and dedicated sta¤ members knowledgeable about the college
application process to alleviate informational asymmetries in the market for higher educa-
tion. Provided the program is successful in its mission we would expect to see an increase
in college applications and, conditional on acceptance, an increase in college enrollment. As
GO Centers specically target those students on the margin of attending college, we would
also expect the program to have heterogeneous e¤ects across the student population.
To test these predications empirically, we link data on the location and expansion of
GO Centers over time to an extensive database that follows the universe of Texas high
school students into Texas colleges. Using a di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimator, we isolate,
conditional on several key assumptions, the causal impact of GO Centers on a range of
potential outcomes. We further explore how this impact varies for di¤erent sub-groups in
the student population. As we do not know which students in a GO Center school actually
used the centersservices, we can only estimate the Average Intent to Treat (AIT) the
average impact of the program for all students in the school regardless of whether they used
the center or not.
While a di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimator controls for any time-constant, unobservable
factors impacting both GO Center adoption and educational outcomes, it is not robust to
time-specic shocks that are simultaneously related to program adoption and outcomes of
interest. Any causal interpretation rests on the assumption that changes in outcomes for
schools receiving GO Centers would have been the same as the corresponding change in
outcomes for schools not receiving GO Centers, had they actually received the program.
Selection into treatment can potentially invalidate this identifying assumption. Since the
state targeted the program towards schools with historically low college enrollment rates and
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disproportionately large numbers of Hispanic and low-income students, we need to address
the issue of common support between treatment and control schools. Therefore, we use a
propensity score matching procedure to construct various sets of control schools that are
similar to rst-year GO Center schools on pre-program demographics, course-taking, and
trends in outcome variables. We then show that there are an ample number of schools that are
similar to GO Center schools yet did not receive treatment, and proceed to present treatment
e¤ects for a range of econometric specications with di¤erent assumptions regarding selection
into treatment.
Overall, we nd convincing evidence that the rst group of 41 GO Centers implemented
in the 2003-04 school year had a large and statistically signicant impact on college appli-
cation, acceptance, enrollment, and persistence rates. Encouragingly, treatment e¤ects are
relatively consistent across model specications. In the rst year of the program, we nd
signicant program impacts on college application rates (4-6 percentage points, depending
on specication) but we do not nd an impact on college enrollment.. Not surprisingly, the
impact was largest (7-10 percentage points) among the low-income and Hispanic students
who were both targeted by the program and were most likely to be on the margin of
attending college. The impact on enrollment amongst low income and Hispanic students in
the rst year varied from 1.6 to 4.3 percentage points, depending on specication, and was
statistically signicant for most specications. Encouragingly, when looking at the second
year impact, program e¤ects are larger for those students who were exposed to the program
in both their Junior and Senior years. In particular, we nd signicant two-year program
impacts of 8-9 and 3-5 percentage points overall on college application and enrollment rates
respectively. We also nd suggestive evidence that GO Centers shifted some students from
two- to four-year colleges - an encouraging nding given the dismal results associated with
community college attendance (Kane and Rouse, 1995; Miller, 2007a; Sandy, et al., 2006;
McFarlin, 2008).
We are also interested in the types of students a¤ected by the program. If the program
is indeed alleviating ine¢ ciencies in the market for higher education as the state hopes,
we would expect that the students enrolling in college in response to the intervention are
relatively well-prepared. On the other hand, the program may simply be operating by
extending the margin of college attendance. Given the evidence on the impact of college
for marginal students, we would not expect these students to benet much from enrolling
(Turner, 2004). To address this question, we look at the programs impact on the probability
of enrolling in college and being required to take remedial coursework. We nd some evidence
that GO Centers are indeed extending the margin of college enrollment; treatment e¤ects are
small and only marginally signicant.. This is an unfortunate nding given the relatively poor
results associated with the remedial education program in Texas (Martorell and McFarlin,
2008; Miller, 2007c).
Numerous studies have attempted to quantify the impact of traditional government inter-
ventions such as need- (Abraham and Clark, 2006; Dynarski, 2003; Kane, 2003; Kane, 2007)
and merit-based (Dynarski, 2004; Cornwell, et. al., 2006) tuition subsides and tax credits
(Long, 2004) on college attendance. An excellent survey by Dynarski (2002) nds that the
results of these studies are remarkably robust, indicating that a $1000 tuition subsidy in-
creases the likelihood of college attendance by 3 to 4 percentage points. However, likely due
to the complex FAFSA form, very few studies have found a signicant impact of the largest
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federal student aid program, the Pell Grant, on college attendance (Dynarski, 2008). Others
have gone a step further by quantifying the impact of tuition subsidies on college persistence
and completion (Dynarski, 2003; Bound and Turner, 2002; Bettinger, 2004). In his study
of the Pell Grant, Bettinger nds that a $1000 tuition subsidy increases college persistence
rates by roughly 4 percentage points.
GO Centers, however, are not a typical form of government intervention such as tuition
subsidies or tax credits. Rather, they aim to increase demand for higher education by
altering studentspreferences and providing information about the benets of college. Thus,
it is important to compare the enrollment and persistence impacts of GO Centers to those of
the larger literature on tuition subsidies. Overall, our point estimates indicate that simply
having a GO Center in a students high school could be equally as e¤ective at increasing
college attendance and persistence rates as a $1000 tuition subsidy. Our best estimate is that
a fully implemented GO Center costs the state approximately $80,000 per school to operate
(Gates GO Center Proposal). Considering there are an average of 197 high school graduates
in each GO Center high school, this indicates that GO Centers achieve the same result as a
$1000 tuition subsidy at a cost of roughly $400 per student. Since college enrollment rates
at GO Center high schools are roughly 50 percent, a $1000 tuition subsidy costs roughly
$500 per high school graduate, so our back of the envelope estimate indicates that GO
Centers could o¤er roughly a 20 percent savings to taxpayers, relative to an extension of
more traditional tuition subsidies.
While our estimates indicate that GO Centers are likely more cost e¤ective than tuition
subsidies at increasing college enrollment and persistence rates, it is a separate, and perhaps
more relevant question to consider whether GO Centers provide a net benet to society.
Since roughly 4% of students are induced to attend college by GO Centers, this implies that
it costs approximately $400/.04 = $10,000 to induce one student to attend college with a GO
Center. This implies that with a 50 year time horizon and discount rate of .97, for the state
to see a net return on its $10,000 investment, the economic benet of college enrollment must
be at least $383 per year, approximately one percent of U.S median personal income. While
there is certainly no consensus on the economic return to attending college, nearly every
credible estimate meets or exceeds this gure. Even though the students most likely to be
a¤ected by the program are marginal students, it seems likely that their return to attending
college should exceed $383 per year. However, as we track GO Center students over time, we
will be able to observe the economic return to attending college for these marginal students,
and this will allow us to better gauge the economic benets of the program.
While numerous studies have looked at the e¤ect of information on choice behavior in
other economic settings, we are aware of only a few studies that have done so in relation
to education. Several studies have examined the impact of published college rankings on
college choice (Gri¢ th and Rask 2007; Monks and Ehrenberg 1999; Meredith, 2004). Kane
and Avery (2004) study the Boston COACH Program, which gave supplemental advising
and college-related information to students at two low-performing high schools in the Boston
metropolitan area. They nd that students at low-performing, inner-city schools had roughly
the same information about the college application process and the economic benets of
college as their peers at more a­ uent, suburban high schools. However, students at low-
performing schools were overly optimistic about their prospects for college, particularly in
relation to their preparation levels. Unfortunately, they have not studied the impact of the
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program on college-going.
We also contribute to the literature on color blind a¢ rmative action policies that seek
to increase racial diversity on college campuses without resorting to explicit race-based ad-
missions policies (Chan & Eyster 2003; Fryer, Loury & Yuret 2003). Since the GO Center
program is specically targeted at schools with large minority populations, it could poten-
tially increase the proportion of minority students enrolling in the states higher education
system in a manner consistent with recent court limitations on a¢ rmative action and other
race-based programs.
Finally, GO Centers provide an important service usually delegated to the traditional,
and often over-assigned, high school guidance counselor. Reseach suggests that guidance
counselors in schools with a large number of minority and low-income students cannot devote
the necessary time to college guidance (McDonough 2004; Lee and Ekstrom 1986). GO
Centers, using the power of peer-to-peer persuasion and information dissemination, have the
potential to ll this important role in a relatively cost e¤ective manner. While numerous
papers have studied the e¤ect guidance counseling services have on college choice, they are
mostly descriptive and tend to su¤er from omitted variable bias (e.g., Plank & Jordan 2001;
McDonough 2004).1 To the best of our knowledge, our study is the rst to measure the
impact of counseling services on college choice that adequately deals with selection issues.
We describe the GO Center program in detail in section 2. Section 3 describes the
data and the sample, focusing on the program expansion over time. Section 4 discusses
identication and estimation. Section 5 discusses the issue of common support and the results
of the propensity score matching procedure. Section 6 presents results and we conclude with
a discussion.
2 GO Centers
Figure 1 shows that Texas has one of the poorest records in the nation in terms of college
enrollment and completion. In 2002, college enrollment rates varied considerably by state,
with a high of 43% in Connecticut and a low of 24% in Georgia, Nevada, and Arkansas -
Texas, however, ranks 44th in the nation, with just 27% of 18 to 24 year olds enrolling in
college.2 Texas also lags other states in terms of college completion rates even when these
rates are made conditional on college enrollment. Figure 2 displays 6-year college completion
rates of college enrollees by state in 2002, which ranges from a high of 65% in Rhode Island
to a low of 25% in Alaska - again, Texas ranks on 35th. Finally, like many other states, there
are wide disparities in college-going rates amongst racial and ethnic groups within Texas.
In 2004, the college enrollment rate among white Texas public high school graduates was
59.5%; the corresponding rates for African Americans and Hispanics were 49.4% and 46.1%,
respectively (Miller 2007).
1 Carrel and Carrel (2006) use the year-to-year change in student to counselor ratios across schools to
study the impact of high school counseling on student disciplinary actions and nd that counselors reduce
student disciplinary problems. However, they do not study the impact of counseling on college enrollment
or persistence.
2This low enrollment rate is certaintly due in part to the large numbers Latin American immigrants. How-
ever, Texas is ranked below other states with similar populations such as New Mexico, Florida, Mississippi,
and Alabama.
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In response to these statistics, the state initiated the College for All Texans Campaign
in the year 2000 (THECB 2000) . The goal was to develop a statewide marketing and out-
reach network to encourage academically prepared high school students to enroll in college.
Integral to the program are GO Centers , which serve as college recruiting centers providing
information about the college application and enrollment process, preparation strategies such
as course taking and SAT/ACT taking, and nancial aid applications.3 Operating under the
assumption that peer-to-peer persuasion is more e¤ective at inuencing actual behavior than
the traditional (and often over-assigned) high school Guidance Counselor, GO Center sta¤
members are supplemented by a trained group of high school students known as a G Force.
The Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board (THECB) is responsible for managing
the GO Center program. The state agency provides GO Center schools with marketing
materials (informational pamphlets, banners, application brochures, FAFSA forms), as well
as nancial and technical support. THECB targets its resources for GO Centers towards high
schools with traditionally low college participation rates. Starting in the 2003-04 academic
year, the program initially consisted of 41 GO Center schools, spread across the state, and
by February of 2007 the program had expanded to a total of 196 schools. However, the
program has su¤ered widely uctuating levels of state support and oversight over time and
across schools, which a¤ects the evaluation as described below.
In the remainder of this section, we rst discuss the causal mechanisms by which the
program may a¤ect college choice. We then briey discuss the e¤ort to expand the program
after the initial year.
2.1 The GO Center Model
The goal of the GO Center Program is to increase college enrollment rates of academically
prepared students, particularly those from traditionally underserved groups. The need for
intervention is motivated by a belief that underprivileged high school students often (i) do
not place an appropriate value on academic success, and (ii) lack easy access to information
and guidance regarding the college going process. The former idea is consistent with recent
models of economics of culture and identity (Austen-Smith & Fryer, 2003). The latter is
consistent with literature showing that rst generation and minority college students tend
to lack the kinds of at-home and in-school information and guidance that traditional college-
going students take for granted (Lee and Ekstrom 1987; McDonough 2004; Plank and Jordan
2001). However, this belief is inconsistent with evidence from recent work by Kane and
Avery (2004) which suggests that low-income students in inner city schools have as much
knowledge about the college-going process as their peers at more a­ uent suburban schools.
There are three elements to the GO Center Model: 1) a substantial marketing campaign
emphasizing student involvement and peer-to-peer persuasion, 2) a sta¤ed facility with com-
puter resources and easily accessible information about the college application process, and
3) linkages with local colleges and universities and/or the local business community. With
the goal of changing targeted students underlying preferences for college, the marketing
campaign disseminates information regarding the benets of higher education and the avail-
ability of nancial aid for needy students. Interestingly, much of the marketing materials
3The name Go Center comes from the states marketing motto Education: Go Get It!
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produced by the state might be considered deceptive. The state produces banners and yers
reporting the median earnings by educational attainment, and claims that the di¤erence in
earnings for college and high school graduates is the economic return to college. Since this
calculation fails to account for selection into college, it likely overstates the true economic
benets of a college degree. An example of one such yer is shown in Figure 3.
The marketing campaign also places strong emphasis on peer-to-peer persuasion. A core
group of motivated, college-going high school seniors, called the G-Force, is trained by the
state to coach fellow students through the college application process. The hope is that the
presence of a student G-Force will serve to create a college going culturewithin the high
school, and generate excitement amongst students about the college application process.
By actively promoting a venue for capable students to come to identify with a motivated
college-goingpeer group, and providing them with the necessary information and guidance
to complete the college application process, the hope is that these traditionally unmotivated
students will respond with increased college enrollment levels.
The second element of the GO Center Model is the facility itself. While traditional college
students can often obtain information about the college application process from parents or
their high school counselor, the students targeted by GO Centers are often rst-generation
college students (or Americans) who attend cash-strapped high schools with limited coun-
seling resources. To rectify these informational asymmetries, each school in the program
operates a facility referred to as the GO Center,which consists of a room on the high
school campus with computers, internet access, and other information regarding the college
application process. Each facility is sta¤ed by a full-time employee whose job is to help
students use the internet to research colleges, sign up for college entrance exams, apply for
nancial aid, and apply to colleges. The employee is often supplemented by the schools
G-Force. Ideally, each student who visits the GO Center meets repeatedly with the faculty
member or a G-Force member to complete the college application process.
The nal aspect of the GO Center Model involves students from local colleges, referred to
as a Collegiate G-Force, and local business leaders. These players serve to reinforce both the
marketing campaign and the informational aspects of the GO Center. Whenever possible,
one or both groups are directly involved with the G-Force in a partner GO Center school,
making regular school visits, and often providing mentorship towards individual high schools
students. The hope is that underprivileged students, who often lack the at-home role models
of more traditional college-going students, will nd that role model in a Collegiate G-Force
member or local business leader. The Collegiate G-Force is also instrumental in providing
information about the college application process, and college life more generally, particularly
at their own college campuses. In some instances, Collegiate G-Forces organize visits to their
college campus for their partner GO Center schools.
It is important to note that the above description is of an ideal GO Center. Due to lack
of funding and oversight, many GO Centers are missing one or more elements of the full
GO Center Model. For example, many schools do not have a full-time employee to sta¤ the
GO Center, and some do not have a Collegiate G-Force. Unfortunately, the state has only
kept accurate data on which schools had a GO Center and not on how those centers were
implemented. Our empirical results below therefore reect the e¤ects of the GO Centers as
implemented. As such, the observed program impacts should be taken as a lower bound of
an ideally implemented GO Center program.
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2.2 The GO Center Expansion
In 2003, the THECB hired an independent contractor to choose and initiate a pilot group of
25 GO Centers in low-performing Texas high schools. The THECB placed minimal require-
ments on the contractors choice of initial treatment schools, only specifying that he choose
schools with traditionally low college enrollment rates and large numbers of Hispanic and
underprivileged students from a variety of regions within the state. After choosing 25 schools
tting these criteria, the contractor was approached by an additional 18 schools hoping to
be included in the pilot group. For the most part, it appears that these schools selected into
the program by virtue of having a close relationship with one of the initial 25 schools. The
18 schools that self-selected tended to be in close proximity to, and often in the same district
as, the 25 chosen by the contractor. In any case, the state obliged and the contractor invited
43 schools to an independent training session in the summer of 2003. 41 schools attended
the training and it is these schools that we identify as the initial treatment group. However,
as a robustness check we replicate our statistical models using the original 25 schools chosen
by the contractor as the treatment group; results are roughly similar, albeit less precise.
The state also facilitated the formation of Collegiate G-Forces on local college campuses.
For each GOCenter, the state identied a set of potential partner colleges based on proximity.
Before the 2003-04 school year, the state contacted each potential partner college attempting
to initiate a Collegiate G-Force. However, very few colleges responded to the request, and
only a handful of four-year colleges had Collegiate G-Forces in the initial year of the program.
Unfortunately, we only have anecdotal evidence on the partnerships for the initial year of
the program. Responding to the low interest in the program amongst the states colleges,
in 2004 the state initiated the Collegiate G-Force Grant, which gives $500 scholarships to
Collegiate G-Force members. To receive this money, colleges were required to submit a
Collegiate G-Force partnership proposal to the state. This initiative increased the number
of (and accurate data documenting) Collegiate G-Force programs on college campuses to 64
for the second year of the program; the program continues to expand to this day.
Unfortunately, the GO Center program su¤ered from uctuating levels of government
support and oversight in the years following the pilot year. (Appendix A discusses the
reasons for these uctuations.) As such, the states record-keeping on the location of GO
Centers over time has been tenuous at best. In many cases, records indicate that a school
had a GO Center in a particular year, when it in fact did not. In others, the state was
unaware that a school had a GO Center in a particular year. Moreover, as the GO Center
program expanded and knowledge of its mission increased, some schools adopted aspects of
the program unbeknownst to the THECB. However, none of these data issues were a concern
in the rst year of the program and we have veried with the independent contractor that
the set of schools identied by the state as GO Center schools 2003-04 were indeed GO
Center schools. For this reason, we only evaluate the impact of the GO Center program on
the initial set of pilot schools.
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3 The Data and the Sample
Several administrative databases track the universe of students in Texas public schools from
high school, through the college application process, and into college.4 Our sample includes
six cohorts of Texas public high school graduates  those who completed a high school
diploma anytime between the 1999-2000 and the 2004-05 academic years. We exclude grad-
uates of charter and magnet schools. While it would be preferable to use the cohort of, say,
11th graders, to avoid concerns that GO Centers might a¤ect the probability of completing
high school, we only observe demographic variables for high school graduates. However, we
have a separate database of high school course-taking that includes courses taken from 9th to
12th grade. Since we are concerned that GO Centers might impact high school course-taking,
we use pre-determined11th grade courses as controls in the estimated models.
3.1 Datasets
Information on the implementation and expansion of the GO Center program was provided
by the THECB. Their records identify the location of GO Center high schools over the rst
four years that the program was in existence (2003-04 to 2006-07). There were 41 original
GO Center schools in the fall of 2003, 92 in November of 2004, 138 by March of 2005, 183 in
March of 2006, and nally 196 in February of 2007.5 Despite the monotonic increase in the
number of GO Center schools over time, there were some GO Centers that closed during this
period. In practice, we only make use of information from the rst two years of GO Center
location data provided by THECB. The models for the one-year impact of GO Centers use
only the rst year all other schools in the state are potential control schools. Models for
the two year impact make use of the second year as well we must exclude as potential
controls any school that received a GO Center during the second year of the program.
A database from the Texas Education Agency (TEA) provides information on all grad-
uates of public high schools in the state of Texas, as well as demographic characteristics.
These characteristics include gender, race, whether the student is bilingual or Limited Eng-
lish Procient (LEP), Title I eligibility status (low-income), courses taken, and participation
in various school programs Gifted and Talented programs, Vocational Education, and
Special Education. Data on SAT taking come from a separate database provided by the
College Board. To these we append information collected by THECB on college applica-
tions, acceptances, and enrollment at public colleges in Texas, and enrollment information
(but, unfortunately, not applications and acceptances) from private colleges in Texas.
There are a few things to note about Texas colleges and the limitations of our data. First,
there is no formal application process for community colleges (2-yr colleges) in Texas; we
therefore do not have data on applications nor acceptances to these schools, only enrollment
data. Second, we also do not have data on applications and acceptances to private colleges
4These limited-access databases are linked through Student Social Security Numbers and are sercurely
housed at the THECB o¢ ces.
5While there are 41 original Go Center schools, we must drop 2 in our analysis. Hemphill High School
did not send the necessary HS graduation data to the state for the 2003-2004 academic year. Estacado High
School was newly opened, and students were being phased in grade by grade the rst graduating class of
Estacado was 2004-2005.
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in Texas again, only enrollment data are available. Third, we do not have any data on
collegiate applications or enrollments at schools outside the state of Texas. We do not believe
these last two limitations will cause serious concerns since more than 90% of Texans enrolled
in academic higher education institutions attend state-funded schools, and few leave the state
for college. Furthermore, the types of students targeted by GO Centers are traditionally the
least likely to either go to a private or out-of-state school, mitigating this selection problem
posed by the lack of data. The data is therefore not ideal, and we will address potential
biases in our analysis when they arise.
One nal important issue with the THECB data is the fact that there are a substantial
number of Texas high school students for which the state has no valid social security number.6
While the TEA creates a unique identication number for these students, this number is
not shared with the THECB, so we cannot track these students into college. Overall, we
are missing social security numbers for 8.9 percent of Texas high school students in GO
Center schools, but this number is much higher among the traditionally underrepresented
groups most targeted by GO Centers. While just 3.8% of white students in our sample
are missing SSNs, 12.2% of Hispanics and 12.1% of Title I eligible students are missing
SSNs. In Appendix B, we present some analysis on the e¤ect of this issue on our results.
While students in treatment schools are disproportionately more likely to have missing social
security numbers, we provide evidence that this should have no e¤ect on our xed e¤ects
results because the percentage of students with missing social security numbers changed at
roughly the same rate at treatment and control schools.7
We merge the above data to two other school-level databases that we use for various
purposes.8 First, we use a listing of distances between all Texas public high schools and
each institution of higher education in the state to explore whether GO Centers induced
students to attend colleges closer to home . This may be the case as collegiate G-Forces
from local colleges could inuence students to stay local, or it could be that students on the
margin (those likely to be a¤ected by GO Centers) are those that are more likely to not move
far for college. We also use a school-level database from the Texas Education Agency with
information on school funding, school accountability ratings, high school exit exam scores,
and teacher characteristics of all high schools in the state. This data is used to help construct
our matched control samples.
6There are two reasons why the state might not have a valid social security number for a given student.
First, the student may simply not have a social security number because he or she is an immigrant or his or
her parents never registered the student with the Social Security Administration. Second, the state allows
parents to withhold their childs social security number for privacy purposes.
7While we nd that this issue does not a¤ect the causal interpretation of our di¤erences-in-di¤erences
estimates, it does impact the way one should interpret our results. In particular, we estimate the causal
impact of Go Centers on academic outcomes for students with valid social security numbers.
8We also use the Barrons Magazine ranking of competitiveness of undergraduate admissions at U.S.
colleges and universities to see whether Go Centers di¤erentially a¤ected the quality of schools students
applied to and subsequently attended. These results are not particularly informative the main conclusion
is that students a¤ected by Go Centers largely apply to and enroll at lower tiered schools. We do not include
these results in the paper, but they are available upon request.
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3.2 Summary Statistics
The states decision to target high schools with disproportionately large populations of His-
panic and low-income students, as well as those with historically low college enrollment rates
is reected in Table 1. Hispanics make up 27.3% of Texas high school graduates overall, but
56.4% of graduates at the 39 rst year GO Centers. Similarly, while 32.6% of Texas high
school graduates were eligible for the federally funded free-lunch program during their senior
year of high school (low-income students), the corresponding statistic for graduates of rst
year GO Centers is 53.0%. Finally, while the state average college enrollment rate is 55.1%
of graduates, only 50.0% of graduates from GO Center high schools go on to enroll in college.
Given that the state targeted high schools that were historically underrepresented in
higher education, it is not surprising that students at GO Center schools were less prepared
for college than the average Texas high school graduate. Table 1 shows that graduates from
GO Center schools scored lower on the states high school exit exam (TAKS exam) and are
less likely to take Advanced Placement courses and Calculus. For example, while the state
average score on the TAKS Mathematics Exam is 68.8, the corresponding score for graduates
of rst-year GO Centers is 64.5.
Table 1 also reects the fact that because Hispanic students tend to be urbanized in
Texas, GO Center schools tend to be larger than the typical Texas high school the state
wide average graduating class size is 161 students, compared to 197 for GO Center schools.
Furthermore, while graduates of GO Center high schools have somewhat lower college enroll-
ment rates, they are more likely than other Texas high school graduates to enroll in 2-year
colleges. The overall enrollment rate at Texas 2-year colleges is 33.9%, while the correspond-
ing statistic for graduates of GO Center high schools is 34.5%. These di¤erences highlight
the need to choose a control group with care, a task we turn to in the next section.
4 Empirical Strategy and Identication
The goal of this empirical exercise is determining the independent inuence of GO Centers
on outcomes related to the college going process. Towards this end, we estimate di¤erences-
in-di¤erences regression models to control for factors other than GO Centers that may have
a¤ected these outcomes of interest. To estimate the impact of exposure to the program for
one year, we estimate models of the following form at the student level:
Yist = 1 (TREATis  POSTt) + 2Treatis + 3POSTt +Xi + s + "ist (1)
Yist is an outcome of interest for student i, TREATis is an indicator taking the value one
if a school had a GO Center in the 2003-04 school year (the rst year in which the program
was launched), POSTt is an indicator for the 2003-04 academic year, and Xi is a vector of
observable student characteristics. s is a vector of school dummy variables and "ist captures
any unobserved characteristics a¤ecting the outcome. TREAT  Y R04 is an indicator for
being in a treatment school in the 2003-04 school year. 1 is the coe¢ cient of interest,
which reects the average increase in the outcome due to the presence of a GO Center, over
and above the corresponding increase for an otherwise similar control school. To increase
precision, we include observable student-level characteristics, Xi, and school-level dummies.
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The school-level dummies control for any time-xed, unobservable school characteristics
that a¤ect college going behavior. To account for correlation within schools, we cluster our
standard errors at the school-level.
To estimate program impacts for those students that were exposed to the program for two
years, we estimate versions of equation (1) using the 2004-05 graduating cohort instead of
the 2003-04 graduating cohort. While equation (1) describes a linear regression function for
expositional purposes, all binary outcomes are estimated using a probit model and multino-
mial outcome variables are estimated by ordinary least squares. As GO Center services
are targeted towards specic subpopulations, we look for heterogeneous program e¤ects by
estimating equation (1) separately for racial and income subgroups.
Central to the validity of our empirical strategy is the choice of control schools. In the
above model, identication of program e¤ects hinges on the assumption that, conditional
on the observable characteristics, Xi, and the school-level xed e¤ects, Si, the changes in
outcome patterns at comparison schools during the GO Center implementation period are
similar to what would have happened at the treatment schools, had they not had a GO
Center that was actively working to inuence these outcomes. This assumption is particularly
problematic in the current application. Since the state actively recruited high schools with
historically low college enrollment rates and disproportionately large numbers of Hispanic
and low-income students, there is strong selection into treatment. In the most extreme
case, where selection is perfect on these variables, we would be unable to nd a suitable
set of control schools that are both similar to rst-year GO Center schools on the selection
variables, and did not receive the program.
Since we can control directly for a set of observable selection variables, we are ultimately
most concerned with the issue of common support there must be a su¢ cient number of
comparison schools in our data that are within the support of the rst-year GO Center
schools (Dehejia & Wahba 2002, Black & Smith 2004, Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008). If GO
Center schools are su¢ ciently di¤erent from non-GO Center schools such that there are no
schools in the treatment group that are comparable to the control group, then a parametric
model like OLS or a probit is identied solely by the functional form assumption. If that
assumption does not hold, then such models could be biased. Thus, the exercise of choosing
a matched control sample is essentially an endeavor to loosen the parametric restriction
implied by OLS or probit by restricting attention to a region of the support that is local to
the treatment schools.
We therefore implement a propensity score matching procedure to select various sets of
control schools that are similar to GO Center schools on demographics, course-taking and
pre-program trends in outcome variables. There are many specic matching methods one
could use to choose appropriate control schools in our context; standard techniques include
nearest neighbor matching, kernel-based methods, and caliper band approaches (Caliendo
& Kopeinig, 2008). While no method is a priori preferred to any other, there is a denite
tradeo¤ between precision and potential bias stemming from the inclusion of inappropriate
control schools. As we require control schools to be more and more similar to treatment
schools, we reduce potential bias stemming from inappropriate extrapolation, but we loose
precision by reducing the number of observations, thereby reducing the utility of our results.
As researchers, we must balance these two concerns. To resolve this conict, we produce a
range of estimates using a series of di¤erent matching methods representing the full range
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of this spectrum.
We begin by describing our rst stage model for estimating the propensity for treatment.
At the school level, we estimate models of the following form:
TREATi;2004 = 0 + 
0Outcomelagss + 
0Xs;2003 + "i (2)
where Treati;2004 is an indicator variable taking on the value 1 if and only if school s is a rst-
year GO Center school, Outcomelagss is a function of lagged school-level outcome variables
for school s , and Xs;2003 is a matrix of school-level observable characteristics for school s in
the 2002-2003 school year the year prior to program introduction.9 The idiosyncratic error
term is assumed to be uncorrelated with the included regressors.
We create six alternative estimation samples using the estimated propensity score the
estimated probability of treatment conditional on preprogram observables from equation
(2) above. The rst sample includes all schools with propensity scores that fall in the region
of common support. This control group is referred to as the common support control group,
and contains 35 of 39 treatment schools and 152 of 1161 untreated schools in the state as
controls.
Next, we go on to restrict the control sample further by implementing a series of formal
matching procedures to select specic control schools to match to each rst-year GO Center
school. All procedures use nearest neighbor matching with replacement, restricting attention
to schools within the common support. The rst three specications use 5-, 3- and 1-nearest
neighbor matching with replacement, respectively. These samples all contain 35 treatment
schools, but contain 89, 66 and 26 control schools, respectively. We refer to these control
groups as the N-Nearest Neighbor control groups. Finally, we construct two control samples
combining 5-nearest neighbor matching with a caliper band. These samples use caliper bands
of .01 and .005, and contain 77 and 62 control schools, respectively. We refer to these control
groups as the 5NN, X-caliper control groups.
A nal word must be said about our models isolating the two-year impact of GO Centers.
Here, we must exclude as potential controls any school that received a GO Center during the
second year of the program. Otherwise, we would underestimate the full two-year impact of
GO Centers on academic outcomes. Other than this slight modication, all models looking
at two-year impacts of GO Centers are run identically as those looking only at the rst year
of the program.
5 Common Support
As discussed previously, identication of program impacts in the di¤erences-in-di¤erences
model (Eq 1) rests on the assumption that, conditional on our student-level observables and
school-level xed e¤ects, the outcomes at GO Center schools increased at the same rate as
they would have at control schools had the control schools participated in the program. Due
to strong selection amongst Texas high schools into treatment, we must rst verify that there
are schools in the state that both did not receive a GO Center in the rst year of the program
9In practice, we dummy outthe lagged outcome variables and percent Hispanic, since most selection
into treatment is determined by these variables.
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and would have beneted as much as rst year GO Center schools from receiving the program
the issue of ample common support. We show below that there are indeed enough schools
in Texas that are similar to rst year GO Center schools and likely satisfy the identifying
assumption for our di¤erences-in-di¤erences model. In particular, we follow Dehejia and
Wahba (2002) in using a propensity score matching procedure to produce matched samples
of control schools that are similar to rst-year GO Center schools. In practice, our propensity
score models include preprogram demographics, course-taking, accountability ratings, high
school exit exam scores, dropout rates, teacher characteristics, and trends in our outcome
variables.
5.1 Propensity Score Matching
In order to construct our matched control samples, we make use of the estimated propensity
score from models of the form presented in Eq2 above. In particular, we predict the proba-
bility that a high school received a GO Center in the 2003-2004 school year as a function of
school level observables, Xs,2003, and a dummied-outfunction of lagged outcome variables
for school s, Outcomelagss. Xs,2003 contains school-level demographics, high school course-
taking patterns, teacher characteristics, high school exit exam scores, school accountability
ratings, high school dropout rates, and school funding. To account for the fact that the
program may have a¤ected factors like high school course-taking patterns, all variables in
Xs,2003 are measured during the 2002-2003 school year. Outcomelagss contains school level
college application and enrollment rates for the 1999-2000 through the 2002-2003 academic
years. Tables II below presents the point estimates for the fully-specied version of Eq1.
Results of other specications are available upon request.
The results in Table II reect the states targeting of the GO Center program. In partic-
ular, we nd that conditional on other observables, schools with larger preprogram Hispanic
and low income populations, and lower preprogram college enrollment rates are more likely
to receive treatment.
To demonstrate the degree of selection into treatment in our data, we present a histogram
of the estimated propensity score by treatment status for our preferred specication in Figure
4 below. Histograms for the other specications are available upon request, but the general
interpretation is similar to that of our preferred specication.
There are two key points to take away from Figure 4. The distribution of propensity
scores for control schools is extremely left skewed, with very few potential control schools
having a very large propensity for treatment. The median propensity score for control schools
is 0.0000238, and only the top 5% of the distribution of propensity scores for control schools
is above 0.15. This observation simply reects the fact that our propensity score model is
quite good at distinguishing treatment schools from non-GO Center schools.
Second, on average, treatment schools have much higher propensity scores than control
schools. While the median propensity score for treatment schools is 0.36, just 2% of non-
GO Center schools have an estimated propensity for treatment that high. This simply
reects the fact that the state actively recruited high schools with particular characteristics
large proportions of Hispanics and low-income students as well as historically low college
enrollment rates to the program. Thus, schools with these characteristics  largely rst
year GO Center schools will have the highest propensities to receive a GO Center. The
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vast majority of non-GO Center schools do not look very much like rst-year GO Center
schools, and have very low treatment propensities.
Third, despite the large di¤erences in propensity for treatment across groups, there is
considerable overlap of support between the two distributions. The majority of treatment
schools have propensity scores between 0.1 and 0.7. While the distribution of propensity
scores for control schools is not very thick in that region, the sheer number of high schools
in the state ensures that there are an ample number of control schools with propensities
between 0.1 and 0.7. In fact, there are actually more control schools 152 in the region of
common support than there are treatment schools - 35.
Finally, the overall conclusion one should take away from Figure 4 is the fact that,
while not particularly thick, there is ample common support between treatment and control
schools in our data. While the vast majority of control schools have propensities below .05,
and many of these schools are not in the common support, there are a su¢ cient number
of potential control schools with propensity scores mirroring those of actual rst-year GO
Center schools. Only 4 treatment schools have estimated propensity scores above that of
any potential control school, and hence must be dropped from our analysis.
5.2 Matched Control Groups
We use the estimated propensity scores from the above models to choose a series of matched
control groups from the set of all high schools in Texas. We do this in three ways: First,
we simply discard schools with propensity scores that do not fall in the region of common
support those treatment schools with propensity scores larger than that of any potential
control school, as well as those potential control schools with propensity scores lower than
that of any treatment school. We refer to control groups constructed in this way as common
support control groups. Second, we narrow our focus even further by using a nearest neighbor
matching procedure to select specic control schools to match to each rst-year GO Center
school. Specically, we use 5-, 3- and 1-nearest neighbor matching with replacement, using
only schools within the common support. We refer to control groups constructed in this
way as N-NN control groups. Finally, we combine nearest neighbor matching with a caliper
band. Specically, we use 5-nearest neighbors with caliper bands of .01 and .005, referring
to control groups constructed in this way as 5-NN-X-Band control groups.
Table III below presents summary statistics of selected demographic and other observ-
able control variables by treatment status for the state as a whole, and the six alternative
control groups generated from the fully specied propensity model. Similar tables for other
specications are available upon request, but the key interpretation is similar.
The key point to take away from Table III is the fact that the matched control samples
look much more similar to GO Center schools in terms of demographics and other observable
variables than does the set of all non-GO Center schools in the state. While Hispanics make
up 31.2% of students in non-GO Center schools, they make up 53-64% of our control sample,
depending upon method. Since Hispanics make up 67.6% of students in GO Center schools,
the matched samples look much more similar to the treatment group than does the set of all
non-GO Center schools in the state. Similarly, while 55.1% of students in GO Center schools
come from low income families, the corresponding statistics for the set of non-GO Center
schools is 29.1%. The corresponding statistic for our matched control sample ranges from
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46-53%, depending on method, so the matched control samples are much closer. Similar
statements can be made for nearly all variables in Table III.
5.3 Outcome Trends
While it is nice to show that our matched control samples are similar to rst year GO Cen-
ter schools on observable variables, it is ultimately more important crucial in fact  for
the causal interpretation of our results that rst year GO Center schools are similar to our
matched control schools in terms of pre-existing trends in the outcome variables we study. In
particular, the identifying assumption for a causal interpretation of our di¤erences in di¤er-
ences model requires that, conditional on student-level observables and time-constant school
factors, outcome trends in the control schools are identical to what would have occurred at
GO Center schools had they not received the program. For this assumption to be credible,
it must be the case that the trends in outcome variables at GO Center schools mirrored the
trends in control schools in the years preceding program implementation.10
To examine the extent to which outcome trends at GO Center schools approximate those
at control schools, we present in Figures 5-6 trends in college application rates by treatment
status for the state as a whole and the 5NN-.01-Band control samples from our favored
specication of the propensity model. In both gures, the thick line represents the mean
for each group, while the dotted lines illustrate the 95% condence interval around the
mean. Similar gures for other control samples are available in the Appendix, but the key
interpretation is similar.
We begin by looking at Figure 5, which presents the trends in college application rates at
treatment schools and the rest of the public high schools in Texas. This gives us a baseline
for demonstrating the validity of our matching procedure for producing our matched control
samples. The application rates at GO Center schools increased at a much faster rate than
they did at non-GO Center schools after the program was implemented in the 2003-2004
school year. During the 2 years following program implementation, college application rates
at GO Center schools increased from 32% to 43%, an increase of approximately 11 percentage
points. This corresponds to an increase from 33% to 34% at non-GO Center schools, an
increase of just 1 percentage point over the same period. Armed with just this single piece
of evidence, one is tempted to claim that GO Centers increased college application rates.
However, there are at least two fundamental problems with this interpretation.
First, the treatment schools had lower application rates than other school statewide
during the 1999-2000 school year. On average, 27% of graduates at treatment schools applied
to a Texas public 4-year college during the 1999-2000 school year the corresponding gure
for non-GO Center schools is 32%. Thus, as one would expect given the targeting of the
program, GO Center schools have historically low college application rates. While this may
seem problematic, this is precisely the kind of pre-existing school-level factors for which our
di¤erences-in-di¤erences model is designed to control.
More problematic for our identication strategy is the fact that college application rates at
treatment schools were trending upward relative to those at non-GO Center schools during
10This statement can be relaxed in the sense that it can be made conditional upon the observable covariates
and the school-level xed e¤ects. We have also plotted the outcome variables conditional upon our observable
control variables, and we nd similar results.
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the years prior to program implementation. Over the 4 school years preceding program
implementation, college application rates increased from 27% to 33% at treatment schools,
a di¤erence of 6 percentage points. In contrast, application rates at non-GO Center schools
increased from 33% to 34%, an increase of just 1 percentage point over the same 4 year
period. Thus, while treatment schools increased their application rates at a much faster
rate than non-GO Center schools after program implementation, this nding may simply be
due to a continuation of pre-existing trends in college application rates. If these pre-existing
trends are not captured by student-level observables and time-constant school-level variation,
then the identifying assumption for our di¤erences-in-di¤erences model does not hold.
To investigate the extent to which the pre-existing trends in our outcome variables are
captured by school level observables, thereby salvaging our identifying assumption, we now
present in Figure 6 below, the trends in outcome variables by treatment status for our 5-NN-
.005-Band control sample generated by the fully specied specication for the propensity
score model. The results in Figure 6 bode well for our identifying assumption. While not
perfect, the pre-existing trends for treatment schools look much more similar to those of the
matched controls than they did to those of other non-GO Center schools. During the four
years preceding program implementation, college application rates at GO Center schools
increased from 28% to 32%, an increase of 4 percentage points. At the matched control
schools, college application rates increased from 26% to 28% over the same period. These
results certainly are not ideal - outcomes at matched control schools still increased at a
relatively slower rate than they did at treatment schools. However, the trends in Figure 6 do
make it much more plausible that the di¤erence in pre-existing trends in outcome variables
for treatment and control schools can be fully captured by the added school-level xed e¤ects
and student-level observable data.
One other factor to take away from Figure 6 is the fact that the di¤erence in post-
implementation trends in outcome variables for treatment vs. matched controls provide a
prelude to the more robust di¤erences-in-di¤erences results presented in the next section.
In particular, we nd that during the 2 years post-implementation, college application rates
at GO Center schools increased from 32% to 43%, an increase of 11 percentage points. In
contrast, college application rates at matched control schools increased from 28% to 30%, an
increase of just 2 percentage points. Thus, a rough estimate of the causal two-year impact
of GO Centers on overall college application rates is 11 2 = 9 percentage points. In the
next section, we further rene this estimate by controlling for student level observables and
all time constant, school-level variation that may be correlated with treatment.
6 Results for Program Impact and Discussion
For each outcome, we present point estimates from six separate di¤erences-in-di¤erences
models of the form presented in Eq1. The key distinction in these models is the control group
used 1) the common support control group, 2) the 5-, 3-, and 1-nearest neighbor control
groups, and 3) the 5-NN-.01-Band and 5-NN-.005-Band control samples. Relatively constant
across specications, the results indicate that GO Centers had a positive and statistically
signicant overall impact for most of the outcomes considered. Not surprisingly, the impact
is larger and more signicant for students targeted most heavily by the state Hispanics
17
and low-income students as well as students exposed to the program for longer periods of
time.
This section proceeds as follows: We begin by discussing the overall program impact of
GO Centers. Next we discuss some methodological concerns related to breaking the impact
of GO Centers down by race and income. Finally, we present the results for the program
impact of GO Centers by race and income for the groups for which we are able to do so.
6.1 Overall Program Impact of GO Centers
Table IV presents our treatment e¤ects for the program impact of GO Centers by control
group. The point estimates shown here are derived from the full probit models including
school-level xed e¤ects and student-level observables. Overall, we nd convincing evidence
that GO Centers had a positive overall impact upon all of the outcomes we study, and these
results are not sensitive to model specication.
Our results indicate that in the rst year of the program GO Centers increased college
application rates by 4.1-6.5 percentage points overall, depending on specication, and this
estimate is statistically distinguishable from zero for most specications. This impact is
quite substantial, representing an increase of roughly 12-19% over the 2003 treatment-school
average probability of applying to college. Not surprisingly, the impact of GO Centers upon
college application rates is larger for students exposed to the program for two academic
years. In particular, among students exposed to the program during the junior year of high
school, we nd that GO Centers increased the probability of applying to a Texas public
4-year college by 7.7-8.8 percentage points, depending upon specication. This represents
an increase of 23-26% over the baseline college application rate at GO Center high schools.
Not only did GO Centers increase college application rates, but we also nd a large
and statistically signicant impact of GO Centers on the number of college applications
submitted. In particular, for the rst year of the program, we nd that GO Centers increased
the average number of college applications submitted by 0.064-0.096 applications per student
overall, depending upon specication. Given that there were 7687 students in GO Center
high schools and using the midpoint of our range of e¤ects, this implies that GO Centers
caused approximately 7687*0.08 = 615 new applications to the states public colleges. Once
again, we nd a larger impact roughly .12 applications per student for students exposed
to the program for two years.
Since most students induced to apply to college by GO Centers applied to lower tiered
colleges with essentially open admissions policies, the impact of GO Centers upon college
acceptance rates mirrors that of college application rates.11 In particular, we nd that GO
Centers increased college acceptance rates by 3.0-5.5 percentage points, depending upon
specication, for students exposed to the program for just one year. While this estimate is
only statistically signicant at the .1 level for half of our specication, it represents an increase
of 10-18% over the baseline acceptance rate of 31%. Once again, the impact was larger for
students exposed to the program during their junior year of high school. In particular, we
11The claim that most of the increased applications attributable to Go Centers were submitted to lower
tiered schools comes from a separate analysis not presented in this paper. Using the Barrons Competitiveness
Rankings, we nd that Go Centers disproportionately increased college applications to less competitive
colleges an expected result. The results of this analysis are available upon request.
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nd that, among students exposed to the program during their junior year of high school,
GO Centers increased college acceptance rates by 6.9-7.9 percentage points, depending upon
specication, and this represents an increase of 22-25% over the baseline rate.
Similarly, GO Centers increased the number of acceptances to 4-year public colleges as
well. In particular, we nd that for students exposed to the program for one year, GO
Centers increased the number of collegiate acceptances per student by .051-.078, depending
upon specication. While this estimate is only statistically signicant for 3 of 6 specication,
it translates to roughly 495 students being accepted to the states public college system due
to the GO Center program. As before, this impact is larger roughly .09 applications per
student for students exposed to the program for two years.
Turning to college enrollment rates, we only nd signicant overall program impacts
for students exposed to the program for more than one year. In particular, we nd that
among students exposed to the program during their junior year, GO Centers increase college
enrollment rates by 3.4-5.3 percentage points, depending on specication. Using the midpoint
of this range, this represents a 7.5% increase over the baseline enrollment rate of 57%.
We also nd that most of the students induced by GO Centers to enroll in college enrolled
in 4-year as opposed to 2-year colleges. In particular, for students exposed to the program
for two years, we nd that GO Centers increased the probability of enrolling at a 4-year
college by 3.4-5.3 percentage points, depending upon specication. However, we nd no
statistically signicant impacts on enrollment at 2-year colleges.
Turning to one-year college persistence rates, we nd no evidence that GO Centers in-
creased persistence rates for students exposed to the program for a single year. However,
among students exposed to the program during their junior year of high school, we nd some
evidence that GO Centers may have increased college persistence rates. While the point esti-
mates are all positive and economically signicant, ranging from 2.5 4.8 percentage points,
we only nd a statistically signicant impact for two of six specications. However, using the
midpoint of the range of e¤ects, this indicates that GO Centers increased one-year college
persistence rates by roughly 9% over the baseline rate of 40%.
Finally, we are interested in the types of students a¤ected by the program. If the program
is indeed alleviating ine¢ ciencies in the market for higher education as the state hopes, we
might expect well-prepared students to enroll in college in response to the intervention. On
the other hand, the program may simply be operating by extending the margin of college
attendance. To address this question, we looked at the impact of the program on the
probability of enrolling in college and being required to take a developmental course. If
the program is extending the margin of higher education, then we would expect to nd a
positive impact on this variable. However, the evidence here is inconclusive. In particular,
while the point estimates for these models are all positive and economically signicant,
ranging from 1.7-3.3 percentage points, we only achieve statistical signicance for a single
specication.
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6.2 Race and Income Specic Treatment E¤ects Methodological
Concerns
Before moving on to produce subgroup-specic treatment e¤ects for the impact of GO Cen-
ters, we must address a minor methodological issue. The concern stems from the states
priorities for targeting GO Centers. In particular, since the state focused attention upon
high schools with large proportions of Hispanic and low-income students, the vast major-
ity of students attending treatment schools come from those two groups. As such, we are
concerned that, once we limit the analysis to schools in the common support, there will be
too few students from other subgroups African Americans, Whites, and non-low-income
students to get very precise estimates of the program impact of GO Centers. That is, since
very few students attending GO Center schools were, say African American, there will be
very few African Americans in the common support control group so that our di¤erences-in-
di¤erences models run solely on African Americans will su¤er from low N and hence low
precision. This is not a methodological problem in the sense that our identifying assumption
is violated, but rather a statistical issue that potentially limits the scope of our subgroup-
specic analysis to Hispanic and low-income students. If we had more observations on blacks
and whites, we could say something about the impact of GO Centers on those groups.
To investigate this concern further, we produce in Figures 7-11 trends in college applica-
tion rates by treatment status for Hispanics, African Americans, Whites, and low income and
non-low income students, respectively. In all gures, the solid line represents the subgroup-
specic mean application rate, while the dotted lines represent the 95% condence interval
around that mean. We report only the trends for the 5-NN-.005-Band control group gener-
ated from the fully specied propensity score model, but trends using other control groups
are similar and are available upon request.
We begin by presenting the subgroup-specic trends for Hispanics and low income stu-
dents, the groups most targeted for GO Centers by the state. The key point to take away
from Figures 7-8 is the fact that these trends largely mirror those run on all students. As be-
fore, the identifying assumption for our di¤erences-in-di¤erences model to isolate the causal
impact of GO Centers upon, say Hispanic application rates, is that the trends in Hispanic
application rates at control schools must be the trends that would have occurred at GO
Center schools if they had not received the program. Given the subgroup-specic trends re-
ported above, logic similar to what we used when looking at the overall trends in application
rates can be used to argue that this identifying assumption is likely to hold for these two
subgroups. For both groups, the pre-program trends for treatment schools mirror those that
occurred in control schools.12
As before, we can back out a rough estimate of the subgroup-specic program impact of
GO Centers upon college application rates for these two subgroups. In particular, Hispanic
application rates at treatment schools increased from 30% to 44% during the 2 years following
program implementation an increase of 14 percentage points. The corresponding increase
among control schools in the common support was just 4 percentage points. Thus, a rough
12In an e¤ort to get a better t for these race-specic models, we also attempted to run our propensity
score models by race thereby generating a separate matched control sample of schools for each race. While
this model is more exible, it did not add anything substantial and the results are nearly identical to those
presented here.
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estimate of the causal impact of GO Centers upon Hispanic college application rates is 14 
4 = 10 percentage points. Similar logic yields a program impact of GO Centers upon college
application rates among low-income students of roughly 11 percentage points.
Turning to the other subgroups, the key point to take away from Figures 9-11 is the large
condence intervals around the trends in college application rates. These results conrm
our suspicion that subgroup-specic point estimates can only be made for Hispanics and
low-income students. Those for African Americans, Whites, and non-low income students
should be too imprecise to make any meaningful inferences.
6.3 Subgroup-Specic Treatment E¤ects Results
Table V presents our estimates for the treatment e¤ect of GO Centers among the targeted
subgroups of Hispanics and low income students. While we ran these models separately
for Hispanics and low-income students, the results do not vary systematically by subgroup.
Thus, the models in Table V pool these two groups to increase precision. Results for models
run separately by targeted subgroup are available in the Appendix. Overall, we nd larger
and more precise impacts of GO Centers among Hispanics and low-income students than we
did for the overall impact of GO Centers.
For the initial year of the program, we nd that GO Centers increased college application
rates by 5.6-8.6 percentage points among Hispanic and low income students, and this e¤ect
is statistically signicant at the 0.1 level or higher for four of six specications. Moreover, for
all specications, this e¤ect is larger than the overall impact of 4.1-6.5 percentage points. As
before, we nd a larger impact of GO Centers upon college application rates among students
exposed to the program for two years. In particular, we nd that among students exposed to
the program during the junior year of high school, GO Centers increased college application
rates by 8.9-11.7 percentage points, depending upon specication.
We also nd that GO Centers increased the number of applications submitted by Hispanic
and low income students and this impact is larger than the corresponding impact upon the
population as a whole. In particular, Hispanic and low-income students exposed only during
the rst year of the program, we nd that GO Centers increased the number of applications
per student by 0.083-0.126, depending upon specication. Considering there were 4972 low
income and Hispanic students in treatment schools, this implies that GO Centers increased
the number of applications submitted by targeted students by roughly 520. Once again,
these impacts are large for students exposed to the program for two years  0.124-0.174
applications per student, depending upon specication.
As before, the impact of GO Centers upon the college acceptance rates of Hispanics
and low-income students largely mirrors the corresponding impacts upon college applica-
tion rates. In particular, we nd that, during the initial year of the program, GO Cen-
ters increased the college application rates of Hispanics and low-income students by 5.0-7.4
percentage points considerably more than the 3.0-5.5 percentage point impact upon the
population at large. Similarly, the two year impact was larger than the one year impact for
both subgroups. In particular, we nd that among students exposed to the program during
their junior year of high school, GO Centers increased college acceptance rates by 6.9-7.9
percentage points among Hispanics and low-income students, depending upon specication.
There was also a larger impact of GO Centers on the number of college acceptances
21
received for Hispanics and low income students than for other ethnicities and income groups.
In particular, we nd that for the rst year of the program, GO Centers increased the number
of college acceptances received per student by 0.068-0.108 corresponding to a total increase
of 438 acceptances for targeted students. These impacts are larger 0.095-0.137 applications
per student for targeted students exposed to the program during the junior year.
Turning to the program impact upon Hispanic and low-income college enrollment rates,
we see a similar, but muted pattern to the corresponding impacts upon college application
and acceptance rates. In particular, for the rst year of the program, we nd that GO
Centers increased the college enrollment rates of Hispanics and low-income students by 1.9-
3.1 percentage points, but this impact is only signicant at the 0.1 level for two of six
specications. However, considering that, for the rst year of the program, we found no
evidence of an impact of GO Centers on college enrollment rates among the population at
large, there is some evidence of a larger enrollment impact on targeted subgroups. Once
again, this impact is larger for students exposed to the program for two years. In particular,
we nd that, among targeted students exposed to the program during the junior year of
high school, GO Centers increased college enrollment rates by 5.3-7.3 percentage points. As
before, we nd that all of the impact of GO Centers on college Hispanic and low-income
college enrollment is due to increases in enrollment at 4-year colleges.
Considering the program impact of GO Centers upon the college persistence rates of
Hispanics and low-income students, we nd no statistical evidence that the program improved
in its initial year. However, we do nd a large and meaningful program impact of GO
Centers upon college persistence rates among Hispanics and low-income students exposed to
the program during their junior year of high school. In particular, we nd that GO Centers
increased the college persistence rates of these students by 3.6-6.2 percentage points, and
this impact is statistically signicant at the 0.1 level for ve of six specications.
Finally, we nd scant evidence for the notion that GO Centers may be acting to extend
the margin of higher education enrollment among targeted subgroups. In particular, we nd
that GO Centers increased the number of targeted students who enroll in higher education
and are required to take a developmental course by 1.9-3.3 percentage points. However, this
point estimate is only statistically signicant for one of six specications, so we cannot make
any conclusive statement for this question.
7 Conclusions and Extensions
In this paper, we have attempted to estimate the causal impact of the Texas GO Center
Program, a statewide college information and awareness campaign targeted at academically
prepared students who were not attending college. The programs philosophy is grounded in
the idea that low-income and minority students tend to place low value on academic success
and lack access to information about the college application process. As such, the key goal
of the program is to increase demand for college, particularly for traditionally underserved
students, by changing these studentspreferences for college and increasing their access to
important information about how to apply to college. Central to this e¤ort is a massive
marketing and information campaign touting the benets of higher education. At the school
level, the program emphasizes the power of peer-to-peer persuasion to create a college-going
22
cultureamongst students, and the provision of free guidance services and easily accessible
information about the college application process.
Linking data on the location and expansion of GO Centers over time to an extensive
database that follows the universe of Texas high school students into Texas colleges, we use
a di¤erences-in-di¤erences estimation strategy to isolate the causal impact of the GO Center
Program on college application, acceptance, enrollment, and persistence rates. However, in
line with the states long term goal of increasing college enrollment rates among low income
and Hispanic students, the state purposefully targeted rst year GO Centers in schools with
large proportions of these traditionally underserved students. Mindful of this selection
process, we are careful to examine the role of selection into treatment in our data. To address
concerns over a lack of common support, we use a propensity score matching procedure to
construct a series of matched control schools that are similar to rst-year GO Center schools
on pre-program demographics, course-taking and trends in outcome variables. We use these
matched control samples to produce treatment e¤ects for a range of specications, each
with di¤erent assumptions about the degree of selection into treatment. By and large, the
estimates are robust to the chosen specication.
Overall, we nd convincing evidence that GO Centers had a positive impact on all of
the college-going outcomes of study. We nd the largest impacts on college application and
acceptance rates. In particular, we nd that among students exposed to the program for
just one year, GO Centers increased college application rates by 4.1-6.5 percentage points 
corresponding to a 12-19% increase over the baseline rate for students at treatment schools.
We nd positive, but more muted impacts of GO Centers on college enrollment and persis-
tence outcomes. Not surprisingly, the programs impact is concentrated mainly amongst the
Hispanic and low-income students targeted by the program. There is also evidence that the
program impacts are larger for students exposed to GO Centers for more than one year.
Overall, the results of this study provide strong evidence that the GO Center program,
as implemented, is an e¤ective way to increase college application, acceptance, enrollment,
and persistence rates particularly among the traditionally underserved students that were
targeted by the program. These results are consistent with the states view of a market
failure in the market for higher education. The provision of supplementary high school
guidance services and useful information about the college application process, coupled with
a vigorous marketing campaign may have served to alleviate a market failure stemming from
informational asymmetries in the market for higher education.
At this point, many questions remain to be answered. In particular, at this stage, we are
unable to answer the question of why GO Centers have succeeded as well as they have. For
example, is it peer-to-peerpersuasion or easy access to information that is most responsible
for GO Center success? We are currently administering a statewide survey of every Texas
high school to collect detailed information on GO Center activity in individual high schools.
Armed with this new information, we will be able to shed more light on the mechanisms
through which GO Centers work, and inform policy for the future.
Furthermore, GO Centers are still a relatively new program and, as such, we do not
know the programs impact upon long term outcomes such as college completion rates,
employment, and wages arguably the outcomes we are ultimately most interested in. As
the rst cohorts of students exposed to GO Centers progress through college and into the
labor market, we plan to study these outcomes, using Texas Workforce Commission data,
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which is housed at the THECB.
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A GO Center Expansion
In the spring of the 2003-04 academic year, THECB hired approximately 20 sta¤ members
referred to as Regional Coordinators,whose job it was to both oversee existing GO Centers
and expand the program to other high schools with traditionally low college-going rates
(target schools). Each Regional Coordinator was responsible for a specic geographic
region of the state, and all regions of the state had a Regional Coordinator. However, from
discussions with former Regional Coordinators, it appears that there was much variation in
expansion e¤orts across regions, with some regional coordinators contacting all target schools
and other regions having considerable turnover in the Coordinator position and subsequently
seeing little oversight of existing Centers or expansion of new ones. Furthermore, and crucial
to this analysis, records on the expansion and location of GO Centers were often missing or
incomplete during the second year of the program (2004-05 school year).
The Regional Coordinator position was abolished in August 2005 due to lack of funding,
and GO Center schools were left without contact or support from the state for the 2005-06
academic year the third year of the GO Center Program. However, starting in the 2006-07
school year, THECB launched a new campaign, the P-16 Initiative, to coordinate resources
between all schools from pre-school through college. Central to this initiative is the P-16
Field Specialist who, like the Regional Coordinator of years past, is in charge of GO Center
oversight and expansion in a particular region. While P-16 Field Specialists were operating
in most of the state at the time of this study, some sparsely populated areas of the state
either did not have a Field Specialist or only had one hired on a part-time basis.
B Missing Social Security Numbers
We now address a source of potential sample selection bias and present evidence that it
does not signicantly bias our results, although it may slightly change the interpretation of
those results. Approximately 9 percent of students in the Texas high school database (the
TEA database) did not have recorded Social Security Numbers (SSN) and thus could not
be tracked into the THECB databases on college outcomes. We rst take a look at the
types of students that have missing SSNs and, not surprisingly, nd that these students are
disproportionately likely to be minority and low-income students. For example, while 3.8%
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of white students have missing SSNs, the corresponding statistics for blacks, Hispanics, and
other races(largely Asians) are 7.3%, 12.2% and 15.4%, respectively. Moreover, 12.1% of
Title I eligible students have missing SSNs while just 6.4% of ineligible students are missing
SSNs. One implication of this sample selection is that results presented in this study are
only the e¤ect of GO Centers on those students who have SSNs. Furthermore, the types of
students that are most likely to be missing SSNs are also those students most likely to be
targeted by GO Centers. So, if we assume that GO Centers are most e¤ective at improving
the academic outcomes of students targeted by the program, then our key ndings should
understate the true impact of GO Centers.
We also nd that there is a higher percentage of students with missing SSNs in treatment
schools (9.3%) than in control schools (8.8%). Our xed e¤ects estimator controls for this
di¤erence under the assumption that the percentage of students with missing SSNs changed
at the same rate at treatment and control schools before and after GO Center implementa-
tion. In particular, for one to interpret our results as the causal impact of GO Centers on
academic outcomes (for students with valid SSNs), we must only assume that the change in
academic outcomes in treatment schools would have been the same as in control schools if
the treatment schools had not received GO Centers. For this to be the case, it only needs
to be true that the percentage of students with missing SSNs changed at the same rate in
treatment and control schools during the period of our study. We show that this is indeed
the case by estimating equation (1) where the outcome is an indicator of whether the student
is missing a SSN.
Table A.1 presents the results. The coe¢ cient on TREAT, represents the di¤erence in
the percentage of students with missing SSNs in treatment and control schools, and we can
see that students in treatment schools are approximately 2 percentage points more likely to
have missing SSNs. This result makes sense given that more treatment than control schools
were located along the Mexican border. The coe¢ cient of interest can be interpreted as
the average increase in the percentage of students with missing SSNs in treatment schools,
over and above the corresponding increase in control schools. The results indicate that the
percentage of students with missing SSNs changed at roughly the same rate at treatment
and control schools during our period of study, and this should alleviate any concerns over
the impact of missing SSNs on the causal interpretations presented in this study.
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Entire State (other than
treatment schools) 1st Year Treated Schools
Number of High Schools 1110 39
Number of Students in Graduating Cohort 161.378 197.103
(5.051)** (22.954)**
Outcome Variables
Apply to Any 4-yr Public College 0.294 0.268
(0.004)** (0.023)**
Number of 4-yr Public Applications 0.441 0.413
(0.009)** (0.045)**
Accepted at Any 4-yr Public College 0.249 0.235
(0.004)** (0.022)**
Number of 4-yr Public Acceptances 0.361 0.351
(0.007)** (0.040)**
Enroll in Any College (2- or 4-yr) 0.551 0.5
(0.004)** (0.018)**
Enroll in 2-year college 0.339 0.345
(0.004)** (0.019)**
Enroll in 4-yr College (Pub. or Prvt.) 0.213 0.154
(0.004)** (0.014)**
Demographic Variables
TAKS english score 68.768 64.464
(0.497)** (2.187)**
TAKS math score 66.988 58.682
(0.478)** (2.188)**
% Economically Disadvantaged Students 0.326 0.53
(0.006)** (0.040)**
% Limited English Proficient 0.014 0.046
(0.001)** (0.010)**
% male 0.502 0.507
(0.003)** (0.011)**
% Black 0.111 0.102
(0.005)** (0.022)**
% Hispanic 0.273 0.564
(0.008)** (0.055)**
% White 0.598 0.323
(0.009)** (0.051)**
% "At Risk" of not graduating 0.338 0.498
(0.006)** (0.034)**
% enrolled in calculus 0.086 0.069
(0.003)** (0.007)**
% taking AP or IB exam 0.444 0.397
(0.013)** (0.033)**










Cohort Exposed to GO Center for 1 year
Apply to Any 4-yr Public College 0.23 0.21 0.21
(9.60)** (8.17)** (7.73)**
Number of 4-yr Public Applications 0.11 0.12 0.11
(7.64)** (7.13)** (6.23)**
Accepted at Any 4-yr Public College 0.21 0.18 0.19
(8.66)** (7.20)** (6.80)**
Number of 4-yr Public Acceptances 0.09 0.10 0.09
(7.32)** (7.02)** (6.24)**
Enroll in Any College (2- or 4-yr) 0.04 0.04 0.04
(1.73) (1.61) (1.72)
Enroll in 2-year college 0.00 (0.02) (0.01)
(0.09) (0.99) (0.43)
Enroll in 4-yr College (Pub. or Prvt.) 0.05 0.09 0.08
(2.22)* (3.32)** (2.72)**
1 yr. Persistence (Any college) 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.18) (0.39) (0.41)
N 374240 97288 50155
Cohort Exposed to GO Center for 2 years
Apply to Any 4-yr Public College 0.35 0.33 0.31
(14.58)** (12.66)** (11.17)**
Number of 4-yr Public Applications 0.20 0.19 0.17
(12.39)** (11.03)** (9.73)**
Accepted at Any 4-yr Public College 0.32 0.31 0.28
(13.34)** (11.92)** (10.30)**
Number of 4-yr Public Acceptances 0.15 0.16 0.14
(11.67)** (11.09)** (9.55)**
Enroll in Any College (2- or 4-yr) 0.09 0.11 0.10
(4.03)** (4.42)** (4.06)**
Enroll in 2-year college 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.73) (0.18) (0.05)
Enroll in 4-yr College (Pub. or Prvt.) 0.11 0.16 0.15
(4.61)** (5.78)** (5.22)**
1 yr. Persistence (Any college) 0.06 0.10 0.10
(2.76)** (4.08)** (3.72)**
N 350701 82858 52712




Dependent Variable All Not LowIncome
Low
Income Hispanic Black White
Cohort Exposed to GO Center for 1 year
Apply to Any 4-yr Public College 0.206 0.042 0.303 0.287 0.074 -0.02
(8.17)** (1.08) (9.10)** (9.24)** (0.76) (0.39)
Number of 4-yr Public Applications 0.115 0.033 0.172 0.149 0.095 0.007
(7.13)** (1.33) (8.17)** (7.42)** (1.52) (0.23)
Accepted at Any 4-yr Public College 0.183 0.001 0.29 0.275 -0.002 -0.068
(7.20)** (0.02) (8.64)** (8.81)** (0.02) (1.35)
Number of 4-yr Public Acceptances 0.095 0.021 0.145 0.134 0.053 -0.011
(7.02)** (1.02) (8.06)** (7.68)** (1.17) (0.47)
Enroll in Any College (2- or 4-yr) 0.038 -0.048 0.092 0.088 -0.015 -0.084
(1.61) (1.32) (3.01)** (3.06)** (0.17) (1.80)
Enroll in 2-year college -0.024 -0.004 -0.039 -0.049 0.127 -0.025
-0.99 -0.11 -1.21 -1.61 -1.45 -0.53
Enroll in 4-yr College (Pub. or Prvt.) 0.087 -0.053 0.183 0.184 -0.232 -0.087
(3.32)** (1.32) (5.25)** (5.67)** (2.16)* (1.66)
1 yr. Persistence (Any college) 0.009 -0.037 0.042 0.031 -0.097 -0.028
(0.39) (1.02) (1.34) (1.07) (1.09) (0.60)
N 97288 46083 51205 57239 9650 28799
All Not LowIncome
Low
Income Hispanic Black White
Cohort Exposed to GO Center for 2 years
Apply to Any 4-yr Public College 0.326 0.24 0.394 0.436 0.15 0.072
(12.66)** (6.30)** (11.21)** (13.61)** (1.57) (1.41)
Number of 4-yr Public Applications 0.189 0.142 0.228 0.253 0.054 0.066
(11.03)** (5.46)** (10.03)** (11.77)** (0.88) (2.01)*
Accepted at Any 4-yr Public College 0.31 0.23 0.373 0.429 0.105 0.036
(11.92)** (5.97)** (10.54)** (13.32)** (1.07) (0.69)
Number of 4-yr Public Acceptances 0.16 0.127 0.189 0.221 0.035 0.042
(11.09)** (5.96)** (9.66)** (11.93)** (0.81) (1.57)
Enroll in Any College (2- or 4-yr) 0.106 0.091 0.103 0.157 0.077 -0.029
(4.42)** (2.55)* (3.17)** (5.27)** (0.86) (0.61)
Enroll in 2-year college 0.004 -0.003 -0.012 -0.008 0.061 -0.029
-0.18 -0.08 -0.37 -0.25 -0.71 -0.59
Enroll in 4-yr College (Pub. or Prvt.) 0.156 0.144 0.178 0.247 0.001 -0.005
(5.78)** (3.65)** (4.80)** (7.39)** (0.01) (0.10)
1 yr. Persistence (Any college) 0.098 0.109 0.071 0.128 0.043 0.013
(4.08)** (3.08)** (2.17)* (4.29)** (0.48) (0.28)
N 82858 40830 42028 48828 8800 24105
Table 5: Program Impacts by Subgroup - Dif-in-Dif Marginal Effects on Treatment x Year 2004 Interaction
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Graphs by GO Center Treatment Status
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Figure 8:  Application Rates by Treatment Status, Economically Disadvantaged Students in 5NN-
























































































Figure 11:  Application Rates by Treatment Status, Non - Economically Disadvantaged Students
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